Introduction
The idea that the political context sets the parameters within which political participation and mobilization occur is quite common among students of social movements and contentious politics (see Eisinger, 1973; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1999; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978) . This holds as well for the political activities carried out by migrants' organizations (Bloemraad, 2006; Vermeulen, 2006) . However, previous work has stressed the impact of the institutionalized political system, largely overlooking more cultural and symbolic contextual aspects. In addition, previous work has looked at the role of political opportunities for explaining collective action, focusing much less on how they influence individual participation and behaviour (but see Leighley, 2001; Morales, 2009 ). This chapter engages with the systematic analysis of a set of 'opportunity structures', ranging from institutional opportunities to discursive opportunities, for the political participation of migrants at the individual level. To what extent does the political context influence individual participation and not only collective action? If there is an impact, how can we disentangle the institutional from the discursive aspects of that context? What are the implications in terms of policy-making?
Following on previous work on variations in claims-making in the field of migration and ethnic relations politics (Giugni and Passy, 2004 and 2006; Koopmans et al., 2005; Koopmans and Statham, 1999a), we look at the ways in which institutional approaches to migration and public debates in this field provide opportunities for the political participation of migrants. In particular, we use data from the analysis of a large number of political indicators and from systematic coding of local newspapers so as to examine the impact of two main strands of opportunities, namely, institutions and discourse, on the political participation of migrants.
Our study focuses on nine European cities: Barcelona, Budapest, Geneva, London, Lyon, Madrid, Milan, Stockholm and Zurich. We start with the
Political opportunities for political participation
Political opportunities have been shown to play a major role in explaining the levels, forms and outcomes of the mobilization of social movements (see Kriesi, 2004 and Meyer, 2004 for reviews). McAdam (1996: 27) has identified four main dimensions of the political opportunity structures found in the literature: the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression. Different combinations of these four dimensions have in particular been applied both to single case studies of the emergence of certain movements (for example, McAdam, 1999; Meyer, 1990) and to the analysis of systematic cross-national variations in social movement mobilization (Kriesi et al., 1995) . Furthermore, recent work has proposed to include within the notion of political opportunities those elements that influence only certain collective actors in certain fields (Cinalli, 2004; Berclaz and Giugni, 2005; Chabanet and Giugni, 2008) . For example, migrants often lack basic citizenship rights allowing them to exert some leverage on receiving society institutions in order to mobilize. In this case, the aspects of the political context that affect their mobilization are to be found not primarily in the overall institutionalized political system or in elites' alignments, but rather in the citizenship rights that open or close their access to the national community (Brubaker, 1992; Koopmans et al., 2005) .
This definition of the concept of political opportunities and its concrete applications to account for political participation face in our view a number of challenges and a major shortcoming. As said, a key challenge is to apply institutional and discursive opportunities to explain not only political participation of migrants' organizations, but also the political participation of Having assessed precise measures of our two main strands of political opportunities across the nine selected cities, this chapter can face another main challenge. These measures are taken as an additional explanatory factor to be put side by side with other factors that are more usually taken into account for predicting political participation at the individual level. In so doing, we contribute to further bridge the gap between scholars working on individual variables at the micro-level, on the one hand, and those who deal with the context of political institutions and public policies at the macrolevel on the other hand. In particular, we evaluate the relative impact of a wide range of top-down political interventions vis-à-vis the individual characteristics of migrants themselves. In other words, we can assess the predicting power of individual variables at the micro-level while controlling for cross-national differences on key indicators of political opportunities.
Among these individual attributes, command of the main language in the country of settlement is considered to be a key factor in much of the literature on the political participation of migrants. Language proficiency, it is argued, works often as a precondition for incorporation, allowing for full communication and understanding of codes of receiving societies (Jacobs et al., 2004) . The generational effect is also considered to be decisive (Grunberg et al., 2002) , with expected differences between different age cohorts of migrants (and their descendants): this is also linked to the analysis of the 'timing of immigration'. Gender and employment are additional variables which this chapter will take into consideration, as they have been used extensively to explain diff erent forms of political engagement, including variations in political knowledge (Hatchuel and Loisiel, 1999) . We also take into consideration the potential effect of other characteristics of individual migrants so as to check whether citizenship (national or not), religion (Muslim or not), or a certain type of migration (focusing on asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants), do have an important impact on their political participation.
As regards the major shortcoming, this lies in the fact that the study of political opportunity structures is often approached as having only an (Koopmans, 1995; Tilly, 1978) , but also from the discourses which prevail in the public domain. These discourses, in turn, determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood to gain visibility in the mass media, to resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse (Koopmans et al., 2005) .
In the next section we show how we have approached methodologically the measurement of the two strands of political opportunities. We discuss how institutions and discourse combine into a multi-level structure that can be assessed through the analysis of a series of indicators at the national and at the sub-national level. In the following sections we analyse empirically the impact of political opportunities structures on migrants' participation in the nine cities included in the study. We offer a general description of the situation of political opportunities in our cities. We then analyse the political engagement of migrants at the individual level, focusing on the difference between political participation and political protest.
Measuring institutional and discursive opportunities for comparative purposes
As it has been mentioned, the main objective of this chapter is to assess the impact of variations in institutional and discursive opportunities (at the macro-level) on the political participation of migrants themselves (at the micro-level). As regards institutional opportunities, we focus on three main dimensions of analysis, dealing respectively with the individual access of migrants to the community of nationals, with the promotion of their cultural group rights, and with the specific opportunity structure in the field of immigration. Each dimension has been operationalized through a set of indicators to be measured along a three-point scale, but also more qualitatively through the production of extensive commentaries that discuss each score. As an example, it can be useful to provide further details about some main indicators that measure the third dimension of specific opportunities. Thus, we have assessed the extent to which public information and support services for migrants are provided in the city (ranging between non-existent and well-developed); we have identified all policies tackling migration; and we have looked for the percentages of the city budgets devoted to the development of migration policies and to the subsidy of migrants' organizations. More crucially, we have measured the involvement of a wide range 
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of organizations, including boards and assemblies that represent migrants themselves, in both the formulation and the implementation of city policymaking. In addition, we have examined the existence of arrangements to favour the presence of persons with ethnic minority background in both the leadership and the membership of local parties. Our indicators also enable us to distinguish between different ethnic groups. All measures were computed by attributing a score to each indicator on the basis of a three-point scale: -1 corresponds to restrictive policies (and therefore to closed opportunities for migrants) and +1 to liberal policies (and therefore to more open opportunities), with 0 reflecting a more neutral situation. We then added the scores of the indicators in each subdimension and calculated the averages within each dimension. In particular, the average score for the first dimension, namely, individual rights of migrants vis-à-vis the community of nationals, is based on eight categories of indicators: access to short-term permits, access to long-term permits, access to family reunification, access to nationality, labour market access, welfare state access, anti-discrimination rights and political rights. The average score for the second dimension, namely, cultural group rights, is based on six categories of indicators: cultural requirements to access the community, language programmes, schooling, religion, media and labour market group rights (affirmative action). As regards the third dimension, namely, the specific opportunities structure, the average is based on five categories of indicators: degree of development of migrants' integration policy at the local level; political representation of migrants; attitude of sub-national powers towards minorities and migrants' organizations; attitude of local powers towards organizations whose activity is specialized in, or has an impact on, migration and integration issues; and electoral support of anti-immigrant and radical right parties. All scores refer to the situation in 2006.
Moving to the second strand of our political opportunities, the impact of discursive practices has been examined by building on our previous work on political claims analysis, in a way to conduct a systematic analysis of discursive interventions in reports of main newspapers in our cities (Koopmans and Statham, 1999b) . Political claims analysis builds on protest event analysis as developed in the field of social movements and collective action (see Koopmans and Rucht, 2002) but extends the method to include speech acts and public discourse variables. We have thus decided to analyse all forms of public claims-making in the field, including purely discursive forms such as public statements, press releases and conferences, publications or interviews, alongside conventional forms of political action such as litigation or petitioning, as well as classical protest forms such as demonstrations or political violence. At the same time, we extend the range of actors to include any discursive intervention in our cities, regardless of the actor who makes it, including the usual suspects of protest event analysis (social movement groups, NGOs, and so on), as well as interest groups (such as employers' Each discursive intervention is characterized by a typical structure that can be broken down into some main parts. Given our focus on cities, we have collected data on discursive interventions which entered the local public domain through publication in a number of selected newspapers. 2 Actor and issue are the main variables for data collection and analysis. We have also coded information on the addressee and object of the discursive intervention, as well as the position towards the object. This latter variable enables us to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of migrants. More precisely, measures of discursive opportunity structures have been computed on the basis of the analysis of one main newspaper in each city. Scores represent the average position of all actors for which claims were reported except migrants themselves.
3 As in the case of institutional opportunities, scores range from -1 to +1: the closer the score is to 1, the more favourable is the discursive position and therefore the discursive opportunities for the political participation of migrants.
Variations in political opportunities across cities
We first present the values of political opportunities across our nine cities. As said, we have unpacked the institutional strand into three dimensions (individual rights, cultural group rights, and specific opportunities). As regards discursive opportunities, measures of average discursive positions refer to the whole migration and ethnic relations field.
4 Table 3 .1 provides the summary scores for every type of political opportunity. While some relevant intra-national variations refer to different groups within a same city, crossnational variation is the most noticeable.
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show in full the extensive variation across groups and, especially, across cities along each dimension of the institutional strand. The analysis of individual rights shows that Kosovars in Geneva are far from accessing the community of Swiss citizens on the same basis as Algerians in Lyon. More generally, Budapest is the city with the strongest constraints in terms of individual rights, while Stockholm stands out for its remarkable openness. The analysis of cultural group rights again shows key distinctions between cities that acknowledge cultural pluralism on the one hand (Stockholm, London, Madrid and Barcelona), and cities that do not promote cultural group rights (Budapest, Milan and Geneva) on the other hand. The analysis of specific opportunities confirms previous findings: thus, London has gone the farthest in terms of provision of political opportunities for migrants' participation while Budapest stands out for its highly constraining environment. Yet, it also adds up some key data that do not fit necessarily with previous findings. In particular, specific opportunities are very closed in Lyon: this is somewhat in contrast with the generous provision of individual rights and the relative openness in terms of cultural group rights in the French city. As regards discursive opportunities, the lower segment of Figure 3 .2 confirms the importance of high cross-national variation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Stockholm and Budapest are situated on the opposite poles of the discursive continuum. The consideration of other cities leaves no doubt about the idea that the discourse is not necessarily dependent upon the institutional context, and hence deserves a central place for treatment itself. Thus, Lyon now stands out for its high openness (second only to Stockholm) in spite of previous findings in terms of specific opportunities. In other words, the constraining force of institutional arrangements and local policy-making in the French city does not fit with the fact that a great share of interventions in the public space go in favour of migrants' interests. Milan provides us with another interesting case owing to the openness of its discursive environment, which is in contrast with the overall negative nature of all dimensions of the institutional strand. Furthermore, combinations of opportunities broaden the scope of analysis. The crucial point here is that individual rights and cultural group rights can be mixed together so as to identify a bi-dimensional space for placing cities in different positions (Koopmans and Statham 2000) . Figure 3 .3 shows that Budapest, Milan, Zurich and Geneva fit well with an assimilationist model, acknowledging limited space for both indivi dual and cultural group rights. Take, for example, Zurich and Geneva, which follow the traditional Swiss treatment of migrants as 'guest-workers'. Here barriers to citizenship acquisition are still very high, long-term permits are defined by strict limits, while cultural rights for minorities are extremely rare, as the absence of public-funded minority schools, or again the ban on minarets during the 2010 referendum, seem to confirm. Perhaps surprisingly, the city of Milan, itself a major symbol of Italian immigration, is also influenced by the assumption that immigrants are not there to settle. By contrast, Stockholm is the multi culturalist city par excellence owing to its extensive promotion of both individual and cultural group rights. In this case, the guest-worker model is rejected through generous access to both individual and cultural rights: the main assumption is that immigrants are there to stay and that policy-making has the duty to facilitate their integration.
Lastly, the other cities provide us with scenarios that are more ambiguous. On the one hand, Lyon fits only partially with French Republican rhetoric since any further restriction in terms of individual rights would be sufficient to push it close to the other assimilationist cities. Let us examine, for example, the common claim that 'everybody can be French'. In this case, it is important to emphasize that in Lyon (and more generally, France) full access to nationality for second-generation migrants is guaranteed (independently of conditions of residence). Yet, one should also pay attention to the criterion of the required time of residence, which is the same as in Budapest (5 years Once again, our data identify the potential risk that true institutional practices and policies may indeed depart from the official rhetoric of nation-states. Thus, when analysing regulations about short-term and long-term permits, or again about family reunion and welfare state benefits, one discovers that access to individual rights in 'multicultural' London is as difficult as it is in Budapest, Geneva and Zurich (that it, the most assimilationist cities of our study). Variation of opportunities also allows for placing each city along the continuum comprising 'closed,' 'intermediate, ' and 'open' opportunities (see Table 3 .1) so as to assess the extent to which a curvilinear relationship may exist between opportunities and mobilization (see Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tilly, 1978) . The cut-off points for detecting closed, intermediate or open opportunities have been calculated on the basis of the quintiles for the distribution of cases on each type of opportunities. 5 The absolute scores that we used to classify opportunities between -1 and +1 make the interpretation of final averages difficult when identifying 'intermediate' situations close to 0, either on the positive or the negative end, along different dimensions of opportunities. Indeed, the multiple dimensions are measured with the same -/+ vector, but they may have a distribution according to a different progression of marginal increments. For example, under the leadership of an inclusive government, increments in terms of institutional openness could be much easier to achieve than the same increments in terms of discursive openness, owing (for example) to the presence of counter-movements and the extreme right in the public space. Thus, we have taken the two extreme quintiles as indicating a (clearly) closed, and a (clearly) open opportunity structure, respectively, while at the same time considering the other quintiles under the label of 'intermediate' opportunities.
Looking at the specific situation in each of the nine cities included in our analysis, we can see the particularly unfavourable political context faced by migrants in Budapest, as compared to the other eight cities, where it is more 
Variations in political participation by migrants across cities
Our analysis has hitherto shown that political opportunities vary across cities and, to some extent, groups. That is, migrants in our sample differ not only in terms of their own key individual characteristics such as gender, age, employment status, language proficiency, timing of migration and so on, but also in terms of the political opportunities that they can seize at any time.
The case of Moroccans in France offers the most extreme example of this high variability, as they are under the influence of closed specific opportunities, very open discursive opportunities and relatively open opportunities in terms of individual rights. This has encouraged us to integrate this type of data referring to the macro-level of the political context side by side with other information gathered at the individual level in our population survey in the nine cities. Before we turn to the results of a series of regression analyses we have conducted and which integrate the two types of data, it is worth having a more descriptive look at the dependent variable, that is, political participation at the individual level. However, it is important to distinguish between various types of activities, as recent work has stressed the need to go beyond the simple 'participate/does not participate' dichotomy (van Deth et al., 2007). They distinguish in particular between four main types of participation: voting activities; contacting activities; party activities; and protest activities. Here we engage, in particular, with the specific analysis of protest, that is, the form that has traditionally been investigated by social movement scholars. Table 3 .2 shows the extent of overall participation and more specific participation in protest activities of migrants in the nine cities studied. The figures are the percentages of respondents who said they have engaged in at least one political activity in the past 12 months from a list of 13 
The impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants
In order to assess the impact of political opportunity structures on the political participation of migrants, however, we need to go beyond this simple descriptive way of presenting our findings. We therefore now move to a set of multivariate analyses that allow us to control the effect of political opportunity variables with more usual factors affecting political participation. Table 3 .3 shows the results of four logistic regressions explaining the effect of the four types of opportunities discussed earlier (individual rights, cultural group rights, specific opportunities and discursive opportunities) on the political participation of migrants. We also control for a number of individual-level variables (gender, age, education, language proficiency, length of residence, having the citizenship of the country of residence, being a refugee or an asylum-seeker, being an undocumented migrant, and being a Muslim). 8 The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable indicating whether the individual has participated in at least one of the 13 activities Model 1 looks at the first dimension of political opportunities, that is, individual rights. The variable referring to this dimension of opportunities is highly significant and displays a strong effect on participation. An open political opportunity structure in terms of individual rights (that is, when they tend to provide migrants with easy access to the community of national citizens) considerably increases the likelihood of participation in one of the various political activities, compared to a situation in which individual rights are more restrictive. The effect is also significant for respondents living in a context characterized by an intermediate situation in this respect, but the odds of participating are lower. Thus, in line with political opportunity theory, and net of certain individual characteristics, the overall political participation by migrants is encouraged by relatively open opportunity structures, but especially by particularly open ones.
If we turn to cultural group rights, whose effects are shown in Model 2, we obtain quite similar results. In this case as well, open opportunities in terms of cultural group rights make political participation more likely. However, the results suggest a somewhat curvilinear relationship between openness of the political context and political participation, following more specifically an inverse U-shaped pattern. This can be seen in the fact that the odds of participating are slightly higher in the intermediate situation than when opportunities are more open. Thus, while the impact of individual rights is linear, that of cultural group rights gets closer to a curvilinear one. While puzzling in some respects, as we cannot interpret the fact that this occurs only for one aspect of citizenship regimes, this finding is in line with early arguments in the social movement literature stressing the (Eisinger, 1973; Kitschelt, 1986; Tilly, 1978) . Specific opportunities also display a significant effect, as we can see in Model 3. However, their impact on political participation differs from that of the two previous dimensions in one crucial respect. In this case, a closed opportunity structure seems to be more conducive to political participation than both an open and an intermediate one, as indicated by the odds ratio lower than 1. The 'worst' situation in this regard is one in which opportunities are hypothetically more favourable. Migrants who live in a context characterized by closed specific opportunities have more chances to participate than those who are in a city endowed with open or intermediary opportunities. A full engagement with these findings is not easy, especially within the limits of this chapter. We think that the crucial point here is that opportunities follow different logics according to the specific target of their impact, and the level at which they are effective. Thus, a too drastic expansion of group-based opportunities may well discourage migrants from engaging politically through more classic and individual-based forms of participation. As work on group polarization suggests (Sunstein, 2002), a strong prospect for migrants' integration needs to deal with potential threats of groupness radicalization. In addition, our data emphasize the articulated mixture of open and closed opportunities at the intersection of different levels. After all, individuals will engage politically when they see that their targets are within reach (Bagguley, 1991). Thus, a restrictive policy measure by the local government may well provoke a stronger political reaction than a similar measure taken by the national government.
Altogether, all dimensions of institutional opportunities contribute in important ways to the explanation of participation, regardless of the variable direction they take. So what about discursive opportunities? Model 4 suggests that this strand of opportunities matters as well. Specifically, open discursive opportunities strongly increase the chances that migrants have participated in at least one of the various political activities, as compared to closed opportunities. In this case, we observe a linear relationship between this contextual aspect and political participation, as the intermediate category also has a positive effect, but lower than open opportunities. Put simply, our analysis suggests that public discourses about migrants and migration matter as much as, if not more than, the institutional context of laws and various types of policy arrangements. Do we observe similar patterns when we look at a more specific form of participation instead of the overall political participation? Table 3 .4 shows the results for protest activities. The structure of these findings is similar to those concerning overall political participation. Focusing on what interests us most, we see that all types of political opportunities play an important role, except for collective rights in the intermediary stage, whose effect is not statistically significant. We observe, however, some differences if we here we find a curvilinear relationship between the degree of openness of the political opportunity structure and participation in protest activities, more specifically a U-shaped relationship.
In sum, our analysis suggests that, with one partial exception (the effect of cultural group rights on protest activities), all types of political opportunities have a significant effect on participation and involvement in protest activities by migrants. Individual rights and discursive opportunities seem to play a particularly important role in this regard, an open context favouring both overall political participation and involvement in protest activities, as compared to a closed context and, to a lesser extent, to an intermediate situation.
Conclusion
The main argument of this chapter is that the political participation of migrants needs to be studied by putting more emphasis on the characteristics of the political context within which they settle. Conceptually, following previous work in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics, but applied here to the individual level of analysis, we have argued that this political context comprises both an institutional and a discursive strand. Our findings show, firstly, that both strands vary in important ways across cities, some cities offering a more favourable context than others. Secondly, we have shown that the overall participation by migrants in the nine cities also varies considerably, and so does their involvement in protest activities. Thirdly and most importantly, we have shown that all types of political opportunities play a key role in explaining the political participation of migrants at the individual level.
Political context matters. Too often the behaviour of migrants is explained with very little or no reference to the macro-level of their own political environ ment. The decision to settle within a precise city represents a moment of key importance for migrants and their descendants, since each city has its own peculiar political borders in terms of access to its own processes of policy-making, discourse and overall community. On the one hand, migrants should be cautious about their final places of settlement: beyond the simple consideration of economic opportunities, the possibility should not be missed to live in a place where access to citizenship is not precluded, policymaking is inclusive, and discourse does not stigmatize. On the other hand, policy-makers and the citizenry in general should be more aware of the driving force of their own polities: cities are, at least to some important extent, true rulers of the game. They can have a major say in the implementation of national frameworks for the incorporation of migrants, they can provide specific mixtures of opportunities and constraints at the intersection with the national level, and they give a distinct shape to actors' interventions in the public space. Indeed, our findings show that an exhaustive evaluation of the political context is possible only after a full engagement with discourse, as it is shaped through actors' interventions in the public space. The consideration of the political context needs to go beyond the study of institutions and traditional politics in terms of electoral systems and parties' strategy. Political provisions, laws and policy-making need to be considered side by side with the interventions that actors of different kinds make in the public space. Our findings show that at least one of the major characteristics of these interventions, namely, whether they are advanced to improve or constrain the position of migrants, can be taken as a major predictor of the political behaviour of individual migrants. Discourse plays an equally strong and clear role vis-à-vis the institutions.
Political context matters, but there is still much more to study about the way it does matter. In this chapter, we have just opened space for further investigation of different types of political opportunities. Each type stands out for its particular relationship with its object, since distinct forms of political engagement may respond differently to the same configuration of opportunities. What is more, opportunities combine into variable dynamics and directions at the intersections across different levels. Knowledge of these multi-level dynamics needs to be fostered for the benefit of scholars, policy-makers, the citizenry and migrants themselves.
Notes

